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There is no person wise enough to tackle and understand
all the systems and their interconnections in order to
address a certain situation. (Boland & Collopy, 2004)
Introduction
Their radical orientation towards the future; the notion of
novelty, experimentation and creation/creativity they carry;
their staging of uncertainty; and the co-evolution of the
criteria to judge with the unfolding of what will be judged
(and thus the centre stage of uncertainty and not knowing)
that they imply make design competitions a fascinating
object — not least for management studies. In the article
at hand we put the focus on the sense and decision making
processes performed by the jury of an architectural competi-
tion. We are aware of the fact that this can be regarded as an
entry-point to a much wider process in the sense that the jury
assessment sessions of an architectural competition can be
regarded as a laboratory from which we might gain a better
understanding of collective decision making processes in
general. We claim that the jury deliberations of an archi-
tectural competition constitute a ‘site’ where diverse forms
of reality are folded, hence: a very dense knot of mental,
material and spoken relational networks. In what follows we
will argue that the act of modulating singularities does not
Summary The radical orientation towards the future; the notion of novelty, experimentation
and creativity makes an architectural competition a fascinating object — not least for manage-
ment studies. In the paper at hand we discuss ﬁndings of an ethnographic study on the jury
assessment sessions of four recent architectural competitions in Switzerland. We consider these
meetings as a laboratory from which we might gain a better understanding of collective decision
making processes in general, that is, beyond the scope of design competitions.
We point out that the relevant criteria for assessment of architectural propositions are not
given in advance; rather they emerge during, that is, through the jury’s decision making process:
while the board of jurors explores the space of potential solutions as generated by the submitted
architectural propositions. Therefore, we believe that a competition jury’s decision making (or
sense making) process tells us a lot about dealing with complex situations. Situations that do not
just display a variety of actors (humans and non-humans) but in particular a high degree of
intertwining of the involved actors.
* Corresponding author at: Department of Geosciences, University
of Fribourg, 4, chemin du Muse´e, CH-1700 Fribourg, Switzerland.
Tel.: +41 26 300 92 55; fax: +41 26 300 97 46.
E-mail address: joris.vanwezemael@unifr.ch (J.E. Van Wezemael).
Published in 6FDQGLQDYLDQ-RXUQDORI0DQDJHPHQW
which should be cited to refer to this work.

ht
tp
://
do
c.
re
ro
.c
h
have to be considered as a weakness or failure since it may (as
in the case we will present) be a ‘proof of excellence’ of the
decision makers’ work.
In order to do so we will use the remaining space of this
introduction to describe an essential characteristic of archi-
tectural competitions, to relate the conception of enduring
heterogeneity from knowledge studies to jury assessment
sessions and to sketch out our empirical research design. In
the second part of the paper we will introduce key concepts
for complexity thinking. In the third part we will present a
sequence of four observations by means of which we will
follow a controversially discussed architectural project
through three days of jury assessment sessions. Then, in part
four, we will revisit our four observations by means of con-
ceptualising the decision making process as what we will call
a modulation of singularities.
A ﬁrst essential characteristic of an architectural
competition
We view the process of opening up (being liquid and ﬂexible
for the production of a variety of ideas) and then narrowing
down (the crystallisation process, that is, the jury determin-
ing a solution out of the multitude of ideas, which is then
actualised into another ﬁxed set ofmaterials) as the essential
realm of architectural competitions. At the outset of each
architectural competition, a given, actual site is opened up
towards a virtual space of potential. Then its potential
becomings are individuated into representations (projects
submitted by the competing architecture ofﬁces), which are
then — in the jury assessment session — contested on the
basis of economic relations, statics and material properties,
power relations among the networks which are folded
together by the jury members, design paradigms, political
struggles and so on. The jury assessment moves step by step
towards a new possible actualisation of a place: the jury
separates out potential solutions until only one remains,
which then is going to manifest the site’s future1 (Van
Wezemael, 2010). Hence jury assessment sessions refer to
both, what is actualised and what remains virtual. In this
respect we propose to view jury assessment sessions as a
‘site’ where singularities that shape the jury’s decision mak-
ing are modulated and eventually actualised.
Enduring heterogeneity
In studies of ‘learning environments’ it is suggested that the
concept of enduring heterogeneity keeps processes away
from being locked into one single basin of attraction. Orga-
nisation science and studies on knowledge-creation show
that there are conditions that are more likely to trigger
the emergence of new forms (organisational solutions,
designs, technical innovations) than others (Chia, 1997; Gib-
bons et al., 1994; Grabher &Maintz, 2006; Kamoche & Cunha,
2004; Nonaka & Konno, 1998; Scho¨n, 1995; Senge, 1990;
Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). As Van Wezemael (2008a) suggests
‘‘we can learn from the analysis of project ecologies (Grab-
her, 2004), geographies of knowledge-creation (Ibert, 2007),
or from science and technology studies (Latour, 1987), [that]
learning processes are fuelled by the connection of hetero-
geneous elements (practices which belong to different places
or to different projects or organizations) and — given a
learning environment — from the encounter with novel
and unexpected processes or ‘anomalies’.’’
If we apply this argument to architectural competitions
and in particular to juries in architectural competitions that
means that the soundness of the jury’s work (and to a large
extent the soundness of the whole competition procedure)
signiﬁcantly relies on the heterogeneity of the perspectives
of the jury members and therefore on the diversity of their
knowings (Ibert, 2007; Van Wezemael, 2008b; Silberberger,
Van Wezemael, Paisiou, & Strebel, 2010). As Gilbert and
Jormakka (2005) explain, it is common practice that a jury
be composed of a group of individuals who represent a certain
spectrum of professional views, interests and inclinations
that populate the vocation. It is generally thought that the
heterogeneity of positions will at least in part balance an
extreme reaction to a project by any one particular jury
member.
Our research strategy conceptually draws on a DeLandian
inspired framework (Van Wezemael, 2010) which combines
the ontology of assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2006) with
concepts of complexity thinking. On this basis we conducted
an ethnographic study of jury assessment sessions of four
recent architectural competitions in Switzerland (see Table
1) in order to open the black box ‘‘jury assessment session’’,
that is, to describe the internal complexity of a jury assess-
ment session instead of focusing on its inputs (the submitted
contributions) and/or its outputs (the contribution’s ranking
and the jury’s statement of grounds). Methodically our eth-
nographic study draws on the work of Latour and Woolgar
(1979), Latour and Yaneva (2008) and Yaneva (2009).2
Key concepts for complexity thinking
The exteriority of relations
Assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2006) replaces relations of
interiority with relations of exteriority. While relations of
interiority imply that ‘‘the component parts are constituted
by the very relations they have to other parts in the whole’’
and the whole in turn ‘‘possesses an inextricable unity in
which there is a strict reciprocal determination between
parts’’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 9), the exteriority of relations
implies ‘‘a certain autonomy for the terms they relate’’
(DeLanda, 2006, p. 11). Hence, a part detached from a whole
represented by relations of interiority ‘‘ceases to be what it
1 Be there 7, 17 or 77 contributions to a design competition — they
illustrate that we could solve an urban situation differently (Kohou-
tek, 2005).
2 Latour and Woolgar have observed scientists working in a bio-
chemical laboratory. Over the period of two years Latour occupied an
ofﬁce within the laboratory and examined how scientists perform the
construction of scientiﬁc facts. Yaneva studied the work of architects
at the ofﬁce of Rem Koolhaas by observing how architects proceed
when designing a building. In the same spirit we observed how juries
in architectural competitions produce their decisions by attending
their sessions.
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is, since being this particular part is one of its constitutive
properties’’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 9) whereas, in contradic-
tion, a component part of a whole characterized by rela-
tions of exteriority (an assemblage) ‘‘may be detached
from it and plugged into a different assemblage in which
its interactions are different’’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 10).
Furthermore, relations of exteriority imply that ‘‘the prop-
erties of the component parts can never explain the rela-
tions which constitute a whole,’’ although these relations
‘‘may be caused by the exercise of a component’s capa-
cities’’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 11). In fact, the reason why the
properties of an assemblage ‘‘cannot be reduced to those
of its parts is that they are the result not of an aggregation
of the components’ own properties but of the actual
exercise of their capacities’’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 11).
Now these capacities in turn ‘‘do depend on a component’s
properties but cannot be reduced to them since they
involve reference to the properties of other interacting
entities’’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 11). So to speak, the execu-
tion of a given component’s capacities involves an act of
conspiracy between the given component and other com-
ponents. Thus, the concept of the exteriority of relations
on the one hand guarantees ‘‘that assemblages may be
taken apart’’ while simultaneously ‘‘allowing that the
interactions between parts may result in a true synthesis’’
(DeLanda, 2006, p. 11).
Singularities
Assemblages are not only an actual formation, they are also a
virtual one due to the fact that the structure of the processes
of assembly is not actual but virtual. Therefore an assem-
blage is not just characterized by its actual properties but
also by what Deleuze refers to as a diagram: ‘‘a set of
universal singularities (. . .) that would structure the space
of possibilities associated with the assemblage’’ (DeLanda,
2006, p. 30). To elaborate, ‘‘analysis in assemblage theory is
not conceptual but causal, concerned with the discovery of
the actual mechanisms operating at a given spatial scale’’
whereas ‘‘the topological structure deﬁning the diagram of
an assemblage is not actual but virtual and mechanism-
independent, capable of being realized in a variety of actual
mechanisms, so it demands a different form of analysis’’
(DeLanda, 2006, p. 31).
Hence, assemblages consist of a ﬁeld of actualities (exer-
cised properties), a ﬁeld of virtuality (potential properties),
and a generative ﬁeld: the intensive, individuating level.
Singularities are virtual, but they are individuated in assem-
blages, and so they are vital to the operation of those
assemblages (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 100). A singularity
can act as an attractor and can therefore be understood as an
un-actualised tendency (DeLanda, 2002, p. 71).
A sequence of four ‘constructed’
observations
Below we present a so-called ‘vignette’. The term vignette
is used in ethnography to describe short, completed
sequences. A vignette is not to be mistaken for a transcrip-
tion (e.g. of a tape recording). It is in fact a reconstruction
of a situation based on ﬁeld notes. In that manner a vignette
can be regarded as an adequate tool providing a clear and
vivid description of the problem at hand. The way we
understand our vignette is borrowed from So¨derstro¨m
(2000). So¨derstro¨m considers his vignettes to be well-
understood fabrications and selections of his observations
without the intention of ‘‘objectively’’ reproducing the
observed situations.
Thus the following four extracts are not mere representa-
tions of something that actually happened. They should be
read as a sequence of four ‘constructed’ observations, that
is, four ‘models’ created on the basis of our ﬁeld notes. The
reason for ‘constructing’ these observations is twofold:
ﬁrstly, we ensured absolute anonymity for the jury members
and also guaranteed to make the architectural projects
anonymous. Secondly, we intend to make statements of a
more general sort (statements about decision-making as
modulation of singularities) and not statements concerning
a speciﬁc competition, speciﬁc architectural projects or
speciﬁc jury members.
The move from actual observations to constructed ones
can also be related to the Deleuzian diagram, that is, to
diagrammatic thinking. The vignette displays an actual
situation, an assemblage of various exercised properties.
Some of these exercised properties are different to the ones
noted in our ﬁeld journal. Still, the assemblage displayed in
the vignette and the assemblages described in our ﬁeld
journal represent analogical settings. In this sense we can
regard our vignette as a ‘model’, a description of not just
one speciﬁc actualisation but one that is valid or ﬁt for a
whole range of actualisations. Creating a vignette (or
model) therefore requires to take a step back, that is, to
focus not only on the ﬁeld of actualities but also on the ﬁeld
of virtuality and the intensive level in order to identify
patterns that ensure analogical performances on the actual
level.
Table 1 Basic facts of the four observed architectural competitions.
BASEL ZURICH WINTERTHUR BERNE
Task Extension to the Basel
Kunstmuseum
Apartment complex
Project Budget 100 Mio. CHF (68 Mio. EUR) 50 Mio. CHF
(34 Mio. EUR)
54 Mio. CHF
(37 Mio. EUR)
35 Mio. CHF
(24 Mio. EUR)
Competition Type Two-stage, Anonymous, selective procedure One-stage,
Anonymous, open
Client Public 2/3 Public,
1/3 Private
Public Private
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Vignette
Bymeans of the sequence of observations belowwewill follow
acontroversially discussedarchitectural proposition (‘‘project
three’’) through three days of jury assessment sessions. A
football club has decided to build a new stadium for approxi-
mately 60,000 spectators right in the city’s centre.
Observation 1. October 8th 2009, ﬁrst day, ﬁrst round
of the jury assessment session of an architectural
competition concerning the construction of a football
stadium, ca. 10.30 am. The jury discusses the third
project. Projects one and two have been eliminated
quickly and almost without a dissentient vote. This
seems to be the case, too, for project three. Several
jurors object to the facade that project three proposes.
Most jurors do so in a rather rigorous manner. Another
three jurors regard the opening in the uppermost tier on
the south side of the stadium as a fundamental weak-
ness: ‘‘The club wants to have a boiling pot. And not
something like an open air theatre.’’ Only one juror
tries to defend the project. He points out that the
opening in the top tier also has its merits: ‘‘If you have
ever owned a season-ticket youwill know that not every
match captivates your attention for the whole 90 min-
utes. There are more than enough games during which
you would be happy about having the opportunity to
watch something more interesting, like our beautiful
city.’’ However, soon he stops his rather half-hearted
attempt to defend the project. His consideration
trickles away. Without further discussion the jury elim-
inates project three.
Observation 2. October 9th 2009, second day of the
jury assessment session, ca. 8.30 am. Before they start
with the second round the jurors review their work of
theprevious day.While discussing thedecisions they had
madeoneof the jurymembersmakes themotion to take
project three back into the competition: ‘‘It is the only
convincing project proposing no completely closed sta-
dium. Probably we want to have that position still
represented in our second jury session. Maybe we need
that position in order to sharpen our evaluation and
assessment criteria. But maybe we should really recon-
sider this position. This architect creates a relation
between his stadium and the city.’’ The juror who
slightly defended project three on the ﬁrst day imme-
diately supports this motion. After only a brief discus-
sion the jury accepts it.
Observation 3. October 9th 2009, second round, ca.
4.45 pm. The jury reaches project three, today’s last
project (due to reverse order). The jury president
opens the discussion. He points out that project three
is the only one left that suggests a stadium with an
opening in the tier. Hereupon several jurors mark the
missing third tier of the southern stand as a ‘‘disrup-
tion’’ and as a ‘‘no-go’’. Then the juror who made the
motion in the morning speaks. He identiﬁes the open-
ing as a pivotal achievement: ‘‘Project three creates a
view — a visual relation to the city. It generates a
connection.’’ Another juror supports him: ‘‘If you now-
adays build a football stadium it is usually located on
greenﬁeld site. But in a case like ours where the site is
located in the middle of the city, you have to take that
as a subject.’’ Soon more jurors share this perception.
The jury is divided into two groups of almost the same
size. One group ﬁghts the ‘‘window’’ in the southern
stand: ‘‘That hole kills the atmosphere. The spirit
escapes from in the stadium.’’ The other group regards
the opening as an essential contribution. However both
groups agree that project three needs to improve with
regard to its outside appearance. The two camps stay
divided. Finally the jury president asks the jury mem-
bers to vote for or against taking project three to the
next round. The result of that voting is six against six.
The jury president’s vote eventually turns the balance
and project three is taken to round three.
Observation 4. October 23rd 2009, third day of the
jury assessment session, ca. 1 pm, in the middle of the
third round. While project three had split the jury into
two equally sized camps on the second day of the jury
assessment session, this balance now gets destabilised.
The alliance that was arguing against project three takes
back both itsmain arguments. The contra-project-three-
alliance can be convinced that an opening of the upper-
most tier is not to be regarded as a severe reduction with
regard to the atmosphere in the stadium. Quite the
opposite, there is now a common perspective that the
opening implicates advantages regarding themood in the
stadium: ‘‘Maybe one does not have to keep the level of
suspensepermanently highbyarchitecturalmeans.’’ The
second main argument against project three, the not
particularly thrilling outward appearance, still lasts.
Nevertheless the jury is now convinced that this defect
could be easily remedied. Naturally project three is
invited to the competition’s next and last stage, where
there is only one other competitor (a project proposing a
completely closed stadium) remaining.
Decision making as modulation of
singularities
If we take a look at our ﬁrst observation we can clearly
identify a singularity: the so-called ‘‘boiling pot’’. The ‘‘boil-
ing pot’’ as an idea obviously belongs to the virtual ﬁeld. It
has already been actualised in a number of football stadiums
around the world (‘‘Anﬁeld Road’’ in Liverpool, ‘‘Old Traf-
ford’’ in Manchester) but has to be regarded as an un-
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actualised tendency at this point in our competition. The
singularity ‘‘boiling pot’’ comprises mainly three character-
istics: The stadium should be narrow, its tiers should be steep
and covered by a roof. The ‘‘boiling pot’’ acts as a critical
point. It plays the role of a template against which all
propositions are measured. If a project shows a high degree
of concordance it is assessed as a valuable solution, whereas
a project that does not match the template is rejected.
Exactly the latter is what happened to ‘‘project three’’ in
Observation 1.
In what follows we will describe how this singularity, that
is, the seemingly robust attractor ‘‘boiling pot’’ ismodulated
during the jury’s decision making. Within the second obser-
vation we witness two trends. The ﬁrst one uses ‘‘project
three’’ merely as a tool in order to sharpen the evaluation
and assessment criteria. By means of this trend the singu-
larity ‘‘boiling pot’’ is left untouched if not to say supported.
In this way the prior evaluation of ‘‘project three’’ and every
negative aspect attached to it can stay valid and yet a door is
opened to get the already excluded project back into the
competition. Moreover this course of action has to be viewed
with regard to the jury having to produce a stable ﬁnal report
displaying a convincing statement of grounds. The second
trend, however, suggests a slight modulation of the singular-
ity ‘‘boiling pot’’. By pointing out the unique quality of
‘‘project three’’, namely that it establishes a relation
between the spectator in the stadium and the surrounding
city through the opening in the uppermost tier, the ‘‘boiling
pot’’ singularity is attacked indirectly. That is, it is not
explicitly challenged. Rather the implications entailed by
a positive appraisal of connecting the spectator to the city
(the stadium somehow has to be opened up) are simply
discounted.
In Observation 3 the jury becomes aware of the fact that
two of their main requests (‘‘boiling pot’’ and spectator-city
connection) are mutually exclusive. This circumstance is
mirrored in the jury’s splitting into two camps of exactly
the same size. The formerly dissenting position with regard to
the singularity ‘‘boiling pot’’ managed to create a situation of
instability: Half of the jurors try to keep the singularity
‘‘boiling pot’’ (the way it is), the other half tries to add a
‘‘negative’’ feature to the singularity’s existing set. Namely
that the aspect of closeness obviates connecting the inside of
the stadium to the surrounding city. Still the same aspect of
closeness keeps functioning positively in the sense that it
generates the desirable dense atmosphere.
Observation 4 then shows us how a second ‘‘negative’’
feature is added to the list deﬁning the singularity ‘‘boiling
pot’’ or, put differently, how the singularity is further modu-
lated. While the jurors in the beginning of the assessment
session were clearly looking for an architecture that creates a
dense, heatedly atmosphere on its inside and therefore
immediately separated out ‘‘project three’’ that does not
propose a completely closed stadium, they now have serious
doubts with regard to the characteristic ‘‘closeness’’. A
closed stadium, the jurors are now convinced, does not just
make a connection between the spectators and the surround-
ing city impossible, it may also inﬂame the inside atmosphere
unnecessarily to an inadequate level.
The sequence of the four observations depicts how the
singularity ‘‘boiling pot’’ is modulated. In the beginning that
singularity disposes a strong internal cohesion. It even serves
as a template in order to assess the submitted projects.
During the jury session the key property of ‘‘project three’’
(the opening in the uppermost tier) interacts with the jurors.
This interaction picks upmore andmore speed and develops a
dynamic which results in a fundamental destabilisation of the
‘‘boiling pot’’ singularity: its original set of deﬁning proper-
ties is manipulated and loses its (persuasive) power. By
allowing the solution that ‘‘project three’’ proposes, that
is, by modulating the singularity ‘‘boiling pot’’ the jury board
explores the space of potential solutions as created by the
variety of competition entries. Against this background we
argue that experimentation and creativity in architectural
competitions can be understood as a tracing of critical points
(which we refer to as singularities), and the submitted
architectural projects as lines that are mapping out spaces
of potential: a ‘phase space’ (DeLanda, 2002). The sum of the
proposed solutions generates a relational space of possible
solutions to the problem as outlined in the competition brief.
Each proposed solution, that is, each architectural project
involves an initial ‘judgement’: an architect who submits a
project tries to anticipate the relations of trade-offs
between the interfering ﬁelds, which they believe the jury
might honour. However, as Chupin (2010) argues, an archi-
tectural competition implies three different judgements: the
judgements which submitting planners make with regard to
what they believe the jury might honour; the judgement of
the jury which eventually picks a winner and which unfolds in
a relational space as opened up by the projects; and the
judgement of the public with regard to the outcome of the
competition, which is also, of course, a judgement on both of
the prior ones.
Kreiner (2008) showed that the competition brief should
not be confused with what will actually be required to win
the competition, that is, with those criteria that eventually
select the winning project. Put differently, the second ‘jud-
gement’ — the jury picking a winner — will only experimen-
tally unfold in the interaction with the space as generated by
the submitted projects. According to Chupin (2010) this kind
of ‘‘reﬂexive’’ judgement involves a medium and a ﬁnal
object that are interrelated: the ﬁnal object of the process
is deﬁned during the process of judgement. The decisive
evaluation criteria thus co-evolve with the examination of
the projects that are proposed. The unfolding trajectories of
‘what the jury is looking for’ may therefore be viewed as a
tracing of the singularities of the relational space that is
mapped out by the competition entries. As we have shown by
means of our vignette some singularities emerge only ‘‘pie-
cewise’’. A jury process can thus be seen as an experimental
modulation of singularities and depicts an open process of
becoming.
Conclusion
In the paper at hand we have illustrated the importance of
the heterogeneity of perspectives for decision making. We
have depicted the heterogeneity of jurors’ perspectives as a
condition for the modulation of singularities and also how
such a modulation can strongly inﬂuence a competition’s
outcome. We have shown that some of the jury’s most
relevant evaluation and assessment criteria are not given
in advance but emerge during the decision-making process as
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a result of the interaction of the diverse component parts
that are folded into the architectural competition. Onemight
say that even our described ‘‘project three’’ as such ‘‘chan-
ged’’ during the course of the jury assessment sessions as one
and the same of its component parts (the opening in the
upper tier) has been related to changing images, switching
functions and shifting ideas. Following this thought we illu-
strated that some of themost relevant criteria for judgement
and the architectural propositions to be judged co-evolve.
The board of jurors in our sequence of observations
managed or dared to explore the space of potential solutions
as generated by the submitted architectural propositions.
The jury board allowed for a modulation of a singularity that
constituted one of its most important tools to evaluate the
competition entries. We suggest to regard this act of leaving
its certainties behind, that is, the jury’s ‘‘intrepid’’ interplay
with the competition entries as a characteristic that distin-
guishes the jury and not to consider it as a weakness in the
sense that one accuses the jury of acting randomly or on no
solid basis respectively.
Finally we showed that a jury assessment session as we
described it should not just be regarded as a collective
process in the sense that a number of people is working
together towards a solution. Rather, as our observations
illustrate, the jurors, the architectural projects in the form
of their representations as well as the discourses, images,
examples, ideas and ‘critical points’, which are introduced
into the decision making process, deﬁne or constitute a
situation where the ‘collective’ must be understood as an
assemblage or meshwork of exactly these components and
not just of the humans involved.
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